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The paper estimates the Portuguese Shadow Economy (SE) from 1977 to 2004 and tests the
statistical relationships between the SE and other economic variables. In order to carry out the
econometric analysis, a multiple indicators multiple causes (MIMIC) model with means and
intercepts is applied. The main causes of the Portuguese SE are analyzed and economic policies
to reduce it are suggested. An appraisal on the reliability of estimates and an alternative
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I. Introduction
An ample literature analyses the causes and consequences of the hidden economy
on citizens, firms and government.1 The Shadow Economy (SE) has relevant
repercussions on many aspects of the economic and social life of a country. On
one hand, the SE is one of the causes of the inefficient functioning of the goods
and labour markets. It introduces a distortion of competition within countries and
among States. A growing SE attracts workers away from the official economy and
creates competition for official firms; it harms involved workers by depriving them
of their rights and guarantees; and the decision by entrepreneurs to work outside
the fiscal regulatory framework produces a vicious circle, as their exit from the
formal economy reduces State revenues and consequently decreases public
expenditures (e.g., on infrastructure, education, research, etc.). Moreover, hidden
activities favour corruption and links between criminal and illegal activities; the SE
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1 For an overall survey, see Schneider and Enste (2002). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 254
hampers policy making as it questions the reliability of the national account
aggregates;2 and the SE increases lack of trust in institutions and feeds resentment
among citizens.
On the other hand, the SE creates an extra added value that can be spent in the
official economy. Schneider and Enste (2000) for instance state that at least two-
thirds of the income earned in the SE is immediately spent in the official economy,
thus having a positive effect on the latter. As Smith (2002) points out, in a world of
minimum wages, high payroll taxes and limits on hours worked, the underground
economy may enable some individuals to be employed who would otherwise be
unemployed, enable other individuals to increase their incomes by holding second
jobs, and provide services that would otherwise be unavailable. Irregular activities
may add a dynamic element to an economy and increase competition in some
sectors. Underground production may improve the distribution of income in society.
Hence, it is clear that the SE not only has negative effects on the economic
system but also generates positive ones. These potentially positive aspects of SE
should be considered in the planning of policies, as the main aim of the policy
maker should be to adopt economic policies which drive the shadow activities
towards the regular economy rather than easily fight them. The knowledge of the
size, sector distribution, dynamics and determination of the main causes of the SE
are necessary conditions for adopting a coherent plan of economic policies.
In this paper, we attempt to find some plausible answers to the following
questions: What are the dynamics and size of the Portuguese SE (as percentage of
the official GDP) in the last thirty years?, what are the main causes of SE?, and what
kind of economic policies could be effective in reducing SE? To find answers to
these queries, we apply an “ad hoc” econometric model, namely a Multiple
Indicators Multiple Causes (MIMIC) model which is a special specification of a
more general approach called Structural Equation Modelling (SEM).
The outline of the paper is as follows. The section below provides an overview
of the definition of the SE. Section III describes the empirical approach and data.
The estimates and econometric strategy are discussed in Section IV. Section V
presents the conclusions.
2 The national accounts are an integrated system, which requires related flows to be recorded
consistently. Recording one part of a certain activity (expenditure on goods and services from
household production) but excluding the other part of the activity (production of goods and
services) introduces inconsistencies in the accounts and errors in the balancing items (Bloem
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II. Definition of the shadow economy
The nature of SE appears to mean very different things to macroeconomists, labor
economists, criminologists, fiscal experts and national income accountants. No
single definition of the underground economy serves all the diverse scientific
aims. Alternative definitions therefore have to be fashioned in light of the relevance
that particular underground activities have to different areas of economic inquiry
(Feige 1989). Several attempts are presented in the literature to summarize the wide
range of proposed definitions of SE (see, inter alia, Schneider and Enste 2000,
Dell’Anno 2003). Although it is impossible to select the best general definition, for
the empirical orientation of this research, we adopted a nomenclature proposed by
the System of National Accounts (SNA93) and the European System of National
Accounts (ESA95). These classifications introduce in national accounts a statistical
aggregate called “non-observed economy” (NOE). In particular, the analytical
ISTAT (Italian National Statistical Institute) framework described in OECD (2002),
is used to show the different components of the NOE (see Figure 1). The NOE
comprises all product activities that can be classified into the following three
areas: Underground production, informal production and illegal production.
Figure 1. ISTAT framework of NOE  
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Underground production represents the area of production activities that are
not directly observed due to: economic reasons as activities carried out with the
deliberate desire to avoid taxes and social contributions in favour of employees or,
also, to avoid observing law provisions concerning minimum wages, the number
of work hours, job safety, etc.; and, statistical reasons as production activities that
are not registered due to failure to fill out administrative forms or statistics
questionnaires because of a lack of sensitivity to statistics and/or shortcomings in JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 256
the statistics system, difficulty in grasping the changes of a rapidly evolving
productive system characterised by small productive activities that are often not
detectable with the traditional survey techniques.
Informal production refers to productive institutional units characterised by a
low level of organisation, little or no division between work and capital, and work
relations based on occasional jobs, kinship, or personal relations (this includes
craftsmen, peddlers without licences, farm workers, home workers, and unregistered
activities of small merchants).
Finally, illegal production includes the activities involved in the production of
goods and services whose sale, distribution or possession is prohibited by law.
Included in this area are also productive activities carried out by unauthorised
operators.3 Due to the difficulty of estimation, which could limit international
comparability, illegal activities are often excluded from national accounts.
In accordance with the SNA93 and ESA95 classifications, the use of the terms
non-observed, underground, informal, illegal economy is not just a question of
nomenclature. They clearly measure different aggregates and therefore require
diverse theoretical and empirical methodologies.
Although the proposed structure of NOE is functional to achieve the
exhaustiveness of national accounts, there is no available aggregate that could be
considered consistent with the wider (economic) notion of the SE. For this reason,
in this research, the NOE is aggregated in three categories: the Shadow Economy
or “economical part” of NOE is defined as the non-observed economy caused by
economic reasons (T4, T5, T6); the Illegal Activities correspond to T7; the
“Statistical part” includes T1, T2, T3 and imputed rentals. By this grouping, only
the first category is considered to be the SE.
III. Empirical strategy and data
Structural Equation Models (SEM) are statistical relationships among latent
(unobserved) and manifest (observed) variables.4 A special case of SEM is the
3 SNA (1993) states explicitly that illegal activities should be included in the system of national
accounts, noting that “despite the obvious practical difficulties in obtaining data on illegal
production, it is included within the production boundary of the System” (SNA 1993: 6.30), and
that: “All illegal actions that fit the characteristics of transactions – notably the characteristic
that there is mutual agreement between the parties – are treated the same way as legal actions”
(SNA 1993: 3.54). The 1993 SNA suggests that illegal actions for which there is no mutual
agreement can be construed as an extreme form of externality for which, in general, no values
are imputed in the national accounts. Therefore, it is absence of consent rather than illegality
that is actually the criterion for exclusion from the production boundary (OECD 2002, p. 38).
4 Hence an alternative name for this field is “analysis of covariance structures”.257  THE SHADOW ECONOMY IN PORTUGAL
Multiple Indicators and Multiple Causes model. It allows to consider the SE as a
“latent” variable linked, on the one hand, to a number of observable indicators
(reflecting changes in the size of the SE) and on the other, to a set of observed
causal variables, which are regarded as some of the most important determinants
of the unreported economic activity.
The MIMIC Model received its name from Jöreskog and Goldberger (1975),
although it had previously been discussed by Zellner (1970), Hauser and Goldberger
(1971) and Jöreskog (1973). In particular, regarding the applications of MIMIC
models to estimate the SE, the first economists to consider the size of the hidden
economy as an ‘unobservable variable’ were Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984).
Following Frey and Weck-Hannemann’s example, other economists used this
approach for their statistical analysis of the SE: Loayza (1996) for Latin America
countries, Giles (1995, 1999) for New Zealand, Giles and Tedds (2002) for Canada,
Dell’Anno (2003) for Italy, Bajada and Schneider (2005) for Asia-Pacific countries,
Schneider (2005) for 110 countries, Chaudhuri, Schneider and Chattopadhyay (2006)
for India, Dell’Anno, Gomez and Alañón Pardo (2007) for France, Greece and Spain.
An analytical representation of the most general specification (MIMIC 6-1-2:
six determinants, one latent variable and two indicators) is utilized in this research
to measure the development of the Portuguese SE. This model framework is
fundamental to qualify how correctly and comprehensively the MIMIC model is
able to evaluate the SE because the model specification starts from the most general
specification and continues omitting the variables, which do not have statistically
significant structural parameters. In other words, the MIMIC 6-1-2 is the starting
specification for subsequent model modification (see Appendix A for
methodological details).
According to the SEM classification, the equation with the relationships
between the latent variable [h: shadow economy index] and the causes [Xq:
government employment in labour force (X1), tax burden (X2), subsidies (X3), social
benefits paid by government (X4), self-employment (X5), unemployment rate (X6)]
is called the Structural Model:
11 22 33 44 55 66 XXXXXX hag g g g g g z = + ++++++                                        (1)
The equations system that links the indicators [Yp: real gross domestic product
index (Y1), labour force participation rate (Y2)] and the unobservable variable (h) is
the Measurement Model: JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 258
111 1 Y dl h e =+ + .
222 2 Y dl h e =+ + .
An intuitive description to show the economic theory underlying this method
is using a path diagram (Figure 2) where the potential causes of the SE are shown
on the left and the indicators on the right.5 Appendix B reports the data sources
for each variable in the empirical model.
 (2)
 (3)
5 In order to eliminate the non-stationarity in the time series, according to the ADF and PP
unit root tests, all variables are converted to first differences.
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A. Determinants of the SE
Government employment in labour force (X1). This explanatory variable is introduced
in order to take into account both the degree of economic freedom and an index of
over-burden of the public sector in the economy. Consistent with the Heritage
Foundation/Wall Street Journal that publish the annual Index of Economic Freedom,
the SE is the reaction of citizens against restrictions to economic freedom. These
limitations consist of government constraints, coercions on production,
distribution, or consumption of goods and services beyond the extent necessary
for citizens to protect and maintain liberty itself (O’Driscoll, Feulner and O’Grady
2003, p. 50). The ample literature on the relationship between the SE and regulation
is contrasting. The large majority of researchers support a decreasing role of the259  THE SHADOW ECONOMY IN PORTUGAL
public sector in the economy. According with this view, there is: (a) An over-
bureaucratisation in the economy. And, the more regulated the economy is, the
more incentive firms find to develop their activities in the underground economy
(Belev 2003); (b) A high relative size of the public sector implies bureaucrats’ have
more power for decisions and obviously the level of corruption rises. Briberies and
dishonesty of civil servants is another potential determinant of the hidden economy
(Schneider and Enste 2002); (c) A large presence of the public sector in the market
needs to be financed by a complex system of taxes. That introduces distortions in
the allocation of resources between private businesses (more efficient), and public
institutions and firms. Other researchers (a minority) argue that, in some industries,
the presence of the State could provide a disincentive for people to join the shadow
economy. From this outlook, the larger the State intervention in the economy is,
then the greater is the intensification of the attack upon the irregular economy,
consequently, we would expect a negative sign in the relationship between the SE
and the index of “rule of law”. Unfortunately, there is no data available regarding
the struggle to reduce shadow economy activities and this effect is probably
overlooked by our empirical analysis.
Tax burden (X2). In the literature, the most popular determinants of SE are tax
rates. The common hypothesis is that an increase of the tax burden is a strong
incentive to work in the unofficial economy. Tax burden is measured by the total
share of direct taxes, indirect taxes and social contributions as a percentage of
(official) gross domestic product. In terms of burden, the Portuguese total tax
revenue/GDP is significantly below the EU average (Figure 3). With reference to
the structure of the tax system, a distinctive feature of Portugal is the relatively
high reliance on consumption taxes: These account in 1998, for 42 per cent of total
tax revenue, compared with 30 per cent on average in the OECD and EU.
Subsidies (X3). They are current unrequited payments that government units
make to enterprises on the basis of their level of production or the quantities or
values of the goods or services which they produce, sell or import (SNA 1993).
The subsidies have conflicting effects on the SE. On one hand, an increase in
subsidies raises the costs to be irregular - this is because only formal activities
have access to subsidies. But, on the other hand, it introduces distortions to
competition and, by altering the net tax burden of enterprises, could encourage
enterprises towards the irregular sector - this is because the criteria of subsidy
allocation, rather than market efficiency targets, could discriminate between firms
depending on their membership of different lobby capacities, geographical
locations, etc. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 260
Social benefits paid by government (X4): This variable includes all current
transfers received by households intended to provide for needs arising from certain
events or circumstances. For example, unemployment, retirement, sickness, housing,
education or family circumstances (SNA 1993). Social benefits, like subsidies,
could have uncertain effects on the SE. They increase the cost of being irregular,
because informal workers do not have access to unemployment allowances,
financial help, etc. At the same time, they are an incentive to participate and remain
in the irregular market, by reducing the willingness of the unemployed to work and
providing incentives to under-declare official income in order to receive undue
social benefits.
Self-employment (X5). The rate of self-employment as a percentage of the
labour force is considered as a determinant of the SE. A significant diffusion of
professionals and self-employed, compared to the total workforce, increases the
potential number of opportunities to hide income from the authorities. Pissarides
and Weber (1989) found that in the United Kingdom those with a significant amount
of self-employment income did not report 35 percent of their total income. Mirus
and Smith (1997), found that in Canada from 11 to 16 percent of income from self-
employment went unreported. Schuetze (2002) support that finding and estimates
that between 12 and 24 percent of self-employment income went unreported in
Canada in 1990. Apel (1994) found that in Sweden 26 percent of self-employed
income went unreported. Bordignon and Zanardi (1997, p. 172) in their work for
Italy remark that “a large proportion of professionals and self-employed implies
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greater possibilities for transferring expenses from consumption to production (to
be deducted from taxes), simplified accounting, and easier path collusion with
customers”. In other research on European countries, Dell’Anno (2003) and
Dell’Anno, Gomez and Alañón (2007), find a significant (positive) correlation
between self-employment and the SE. As Bronchi and Gomes-Santos (2001) state
there is a bias in the Portuguese tax burden (including social contributions) in
favour of the self-employed. This factor compounded by relatively tight
employment-protection legislation explains why the share of self-employed in total
employment is one of the highest in the OECD area (see Figure 4).6 They can
evade taxes by deducting some of their private consumption as business expenses,
as well as benefit from most of the tax allowance granted to incorporated companies.
Moreover, tax legislation makes evasion easy for these workers: subject to certain
turnover limits (20 times the national minimum wage), book-keeping is not
compulsory for the self-employed, and they are not required to keep separate bank
accounts for private and professional activity.
6 Estimates of the Instituto de Gestão Financeira da Seguranca Social (IGFSS), which manages
the general system of social security contributions in Portugal, show that the self-employed
tend to pay the highest legal rate - to benefit from the broad coverage of the social security
system - but choose the lower base allowed by the system (i.e. the minimum national
remuneration) in order to minimise taxes without losing the associated benefits. Bronchi and
Gomes-Santos (2001, p. 28).
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Unemployment rate (X6). The labour force of the hidden economy is composed
of very heterogeneous workers; one part is classified as unemployed because
they are components of the official labour force, the other part of ‘hidden’ workers
is composed of retired people, minors and housewives who are not part of the
official workforce. Furthermore, there are people who have both an official and
unofficial job at the same time (Tanzi 1999, p. 343). In this sense, the official
unemployment rate could be weakly correlated with the SE.
B. Indicators
Two variables are used as indicators of the latent variable: the real (official) gross
domestic product index (1995=100) and the labour force participation rate, to measure
the development of the SE.
Real gross domestic product index (base year 1995=100) (Y1). The discussion
about this indicator is crucial to the problem of identification as well as for the
theoretical consequences it implies, mainly because it is chosen as a variable of
scale (or reference variable). Since the latent variable is unmeasured, the
researcher must set its unit of measurement. We fix the coefficient l1equal to a
nonzero value. The choice of this value can be restricted between two alternatives
(+1 or -1) because, by using a unitary base for normalization, the estimated
coefficients are more easily comparable.7 Following Dell’Anno (2003), we use a
strategy that determines the sign of coefficient of scale through a reductio ad
absurdum. As in the MIMIC model the vector of structural coefficients is
proportional to the coefficient of scale, when the sign of l1is changed, the
structural parameters gq of the causes change from positive to negative (and
viceversa) keeping the same absolute values. According with this property, if
the signs of the estimated coefficients that link the underground economy and
its causes are completely divergent from well-known theories and empirical studies
in one case (e.g., l1 = +1), then the hypothesis supporting the opposite sign for
the relationships between shadow economy and reference variable should be
accepted as more rational.8 Unfortunately, in the literature there is no common
view about what is the sign of the relationship between official and unofficial
7 For details about the effects of normalization on structural coefficients, see Dell’Anno,
Gomez and Alañón (2007).
8 This approach is not very different from the calibration procedure. It means taking parameters
that have been estimated for a similar model into one’s own model.263  THE SHADOW ECONOMY IN PORTUGAL
economy. Can a downturn in the economic official activities lead to a loss of
jobs and thus drive more individuals into the hidden economy or, on the contrary,
can a contraction in the GDP reduce the demand for underground products and
thus offset the first effect? Empirical answers to these questions are contrasting.
Adam and Ginsburgh (1985) for Belgium, Giles and Tedds (2002) for Canada,
Chatterjee, Chaudhuri and Schneider (2003) for Asian countries, find a positive
relation between SE and official GDP, while Frey and Weck-Hannemann (1984)
for 17 OECD countries, Loayza (1996) for 14 Latin America countries, Kaufmann
and Kaliberda (1996) for Transition countries, Eilat and Zinnes (2000) for transition
countries, Schneider and Enste (2000) for 76 Countries, Ott (2002) for Croatia,
Dell’Anno (2003) for Italy, Dell’Anno, Gomez and Alañón  (2007) for France,
Greece and Spain, find a negative relationship. Moreover, Schneider (2005) shows
a negative sign for transition and developing countries and a positive relationship
for developed ones.
Labour force participation rate (Y2). The labour force participation rate is
calculated as the ratio of the total labour force (LF) and the population of working
age (15-64 years old). Some authors (e.g., Fuà 1976, Contini 1981) estimated the
size of the hidden economy from changes in the labour force participation rate.
According to Giles (1998) a decline in this rate over time or a low rate relative to
those in comparable economies may reflect a movement of the workforce from the
measured economy into hidden activities. By including this variable as an indicator,
it is possible to determine empirically if there is a flow of resources between official
and underground economy. The fact that changes in participation reflect variations
in the SE, or vice versa, is uncertain and conflicting hypothesis must be considered.
Numerous empirical evidence shows that unrecorded economic activity is only
partially undertaken by members of the measured workforce. For Bajada and
Schneider (2005), it is possible that the participation rate may be unaffected by SE
activity if such activities are undertaken after hours or on weekends when
individuals are not working in the regular economy. In our opinion there is a further
warning, in the last forty years the structural composition of the labour force has
strongly changed. In particular, the effect that changes in the black labour market
have on the participation ratio could be biased by the growing female participation
in the workforce. In general, however, there is a tendency to conclude that people
do not withdraw from the measured labour market in order to participate in the SE.
According with  the previous arguments, we suggest to cautiously consider the
MIMIC output for this indicator. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 264
IV. Estimates and benchmarking strategy
A. Results of the MIMIC model
The maximum likelihood estimatated coefficients are shown in Table 1. Since causes
are measured with the same unit of measurement (percentage points), the
coefficients of Table 1 are directly comparable in order to evaluate relative weight
to explain the dynamics of SE. In particular, estimation outputs reveal that the main
causes of SE, among those included in the MIMIC model, are (in decreasing order):
social benefits/GDP, the proxy of (lack) economic freedom, the unemployment rate
and self-employment/labor force. Starting from MIMIC 6-1-2, and deleting
nonsignificant paths, we consider MIMIC 4-1-2 as the best model.
Table 1. Estimated coefficients of the MIMIC models and global goodness of fit
statistics
Empl.gov. Tax burden Subsidies Social benef. Self-empl. Unempl. Particip.
/Lab. force  /GDP /GDP  /Lab. force rate lab. force
MIMIC 6-1-2 0.70 * 0.03 0.20 0.91 * 0.50 * 0.62 * 0.37 *
(2.12) (0.19) (0.49) (2.52) (3.99) (3.90) (2.69)
MIMIC 5-1-2 0.73 * — 0.20 0.94 * 0.49 * 0.62 * 0.36 *
(2.36) (0.49) (2.75) (4.49) (4.06) (2.68)
MIMIC 4-1-2 0.75 * — — 0.93 * 0.48 * 0.62 * 0.38 *
(2.52) (2.75) (4.46) (4.11) (2.71)
Global Chi-square2 RMSEA3 Degrees of Intercept
Goodness of (p-value) (p-value) freedom4 (a)
Fit Statistics
MIMIC 6-1-2 12.41+ 0.055+ 10 - 0.14
(0.258) (0.41) (-0.79)
MIMIC 5-1-2 9.81+ 0.09+ 6 - 0.15
(0.133) (0.22) (-0.79)
MIMIC 4-1-2 6.86+ 0.069+ 5 - 0.14
(0.231) (0.33) (-0.79)
Notes: z-statistics are given in parentheses. * Means |z-statistic|>1.96; + Means good fitting (p-value > 0.05).
2 If the structural equation model is correct and the population parameters are known, then the matrix S
(sample covariance matrix) will equal S(q) (model-implied covariance matrix) therefore the perfect fitting
correspond to p-value=1. This test has a statistical validity if there are large sample and multinormal
distributions.  3  p-value for Test of Close Fit (RMSEA < 0.05). 4 The degrees of freedom are determined by
0.5(p+q)(p+q+1)+m-t, where “p” is the number of indicators, “q” the number of causes, “m” the number of
means and intercepts and “t” is the number of free parameters.
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B. Benchmarking procedure and estimates of the Portuguese SE
The SE as a percentage of GDP is calculated by converting the index of SE estimated
by the structural model (equation 1). As Breusch (2005) highlights, several
benchmarking procedures exist that estimate the size of the SE by MIMIC outputs.
Unfortunately, at this stage of research on the Model approach, which benchmark
method should be applied is not definite yet. In the following, we apply an alternative
two-step procedure.9
Step I
According to the previously applied identification rule, the latent variable has the
same scale as the reference indicator. In order to preserve the proportional
relationship between the indicator and the latent variable, we divide the first
difference in the biannual official GDP by a base value. According with the scaling
operation applied to official GDP, we deduce that the latent variable (index of SE) is
measured as changes compared to the same base year. In the Portuguese analysis,
the base is the first semester of 1995 because for this period there is an exogenous
estimate of SE/GDP extracted by Schneider (2005).10 It is equal to 22.1% and
corresponds to the average between the years 1994 and 1995. By substituting the
two chains of indexes (index of changes in real GDP respect to 1995 and index of











                                       (4)
9 For a fuller treatment of this subject, we refer the reader to Dell’Anno and Schneider (2006).
10 In order to evaluate the dependence of results on the choice of base year and the exogenous
estimation of SE/GDP, we re-estimate the MIMIC model by adopting the SE estimate for 2001
(22.5%) extracted by Schneider (2005). Statistical significance and proportionality among
structural coefficients are preserved in the outputs. The rebasing choice affects the absolute
level of the series without significant differences in the rates of growth. In particular, the
absolute values of the SE/GDP estimates translate upward six percentage points (on average) to
satisfy the condition that estimated SE as percentage of GDP in 2001 is equal to 22.5%; the
differences among annual growth rates of SE when the base year is 2001 instead of 1995 is
0.15% (on average). JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 266
Where the index of changes in SE/GDP is estimated according with the following
equation:11
Structural equation:   1456
1995







           (5)
Step II
Finally, the index is scaled to take up to a value of 22.1 percent in 1995 and further
transformed from changes compared to 1995 into a time series of SE/current GDP.













where  () 1995 / t GDP h % is calculated by equation(5);  ()
*
1995 1995 / 22.1% GDP h = is
the exogenous estimate of SE; () 1995 1995 /GDP h % is the value of index estimated by
equation (5) in 1995; () 1995 / t GDP GDP  is to convert the index of changes respect
to the GDP in base year in a time series of SE/current GDP; () ˆ / tt GDP h is the
estimated shadow economy as a percentage of official GDP.











In Table 2, numerical values are presented for the period 1977 to 2004.
11 The intercept is not included because it is not statistically significant, see Table 1. Moreover,
as the variables are all differenced to the same degree, to calculate the levels of the latent
variable multiplying the structural coefficients for raw (unfiltered) data, it is equivalent to
compute the changes in the index by multiplying coefficients for the differenced causes and
then to integrate them.
 (6)
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Table 2. Shadow Economy estimated by MIMIC model
Years 1977/79 1980/82 1983/85 1986/88 1989/91 1992/94 1995/97 1998/00 2001/03 2004
Shadow
Economy 28.8% 26.4% 27.6% 24.6% 20.2% 21.9% 21.4% 18.5% 17.9% 17.6%
12  The line for Schneider’s estimates is calculated by linear interpolation of the six biennial
estimates.
In Figure 5, the outcomes of MIMIC 4-1-2 are shown together with some of the
most relevant economic events and an alternative estimate of SE provided by
Schneider (2005).12


































































































































Schneider (2005, table 3.8) MIMIC 4-1-2
Constitutional revision (denationalise, tax 
reform, 1989)
VAT (1986)
Convergence criteria to entry in 
EMU (1994-1999)
Euro (2002)
As can be seen in Figure 5, in what concerns the size of the SE with respect to
GDP, the dimension of SE ranges from around 30 %, in 1978, to around 17% in 2004,
and the SE slightly decreases except for two periods, from 1983 to 1984 and from
1992 to 1994. The first five years of the nineties show a temporary change in the
decreasing dynamics of the size of SE. The growth of the SE stops at the end of
1994, and decreases until 2004.
The MIMIC analysis reveals that social benefits/GDP, the proxy of (lack)
economic freedom, the unemployment rate and self-employment/labor force are
the main causes of the SE dynamics. We calculate (and report in Table 3) the five-
year averages of annual growth rates for these variables to see if they help us
understand the reasons behind the SE dynamics in Potugal. JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 268
Table 3. Five-year average of annual growth rates
1985-1989 +2.8% +0.1% -1.1% -9.3% -6.0%
1990-1994 +2.8% +7.2% +1.9% +7.2% +2.3%
1995-1999 +1.5% -1.2% +0.1% -7.8% -4.5%
2000-2004 -0.3% +2.4% -1.3% +8.6% -0.8%
The decreasing trend in the SE from 1985 to 1989 (-6.0%) and from 1995 to 1999 (-
4.5%) was simultaneous with large reductions in the unemployment rate. For the
period 1990 to 1994, we observe a growth in the SE and a simultaneous increase in all
four causal variables. Finally, for the 2000 to 2004 period, there are increasing and
decreasing growth rates. There seems to be a compensation among causal variables.
V. Conclusions
This paper attempts to estimate the Portuguese SE from 1977 to 2004 and economic
recommendations for policy makers are provided. Concerning the econometric
analysis, we followed Giles’ (1995) suggestion to detect unit roots and applied the
subsequent corrections. Moreover,  an alternative benchmark strategy is proposed
in the attempt to improve the reliability of SE estimates.
In what concerns the size of the SE with respect to GDP, we found that the
dimension of SE ranges from 29.6 percent, in 1978, to 17.6 percent of official GDP in
2004. The SE slightly decreases except for two periods, from 1983 to 1984 and from
1992 to 1994.
An economic explanation for this result is challenging. The two main reforms
carried out at the end of the 1980’s, i.e., reform of the tax system and reform of the
Constitution, seem to be associated to an increase of the SE. The reform of the tax
system was approved in 1989 and consisted in broadening the tax bases (e.g., the
introduction of VAT in 1986) and lowering rates. As Bronchi and Gomes-Santos
(2001) affirm, the complexity of tax laws, exacerbated by the frequent revisions and
amendments that followed the 1989 tax reform, together with leniency of the laws
against tax evasion, could provide a reasonable justification for the increase of the
SE in the period 1990-1995. The revision of the Constitution also took place in
1989. It reduced the role of the State in economy and social affairs. It abolished the
communist-inspired «agrarian reform» which permitted the denationalisation of
the State-owned banks and other public enterprises. We could suppose that
Years  Empl. gov./ 
Lab. force 
Soc. benef./ 
GDP  Self-empl.  Unempl. 
rate 
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structural reforms (e.g., denationalisation, reduction of the State’s role in economy,
agrarian reform) are a much more complex and lengthy process that requires several
years. According with this view, while the tax reform is usually effective in the
same year it is introduced, the delayed effects of the constitutional revision passed
in 1989 and the tax reforms contributed in reducing SE only after a transition
period, probably after 1994.
From 1994 to 1999, like the other European member countries, Portugal had to
coordinate its economic policies in order to abide by the convergence criteria of
the Treaty of Maastricht. This included reduction of inflation and interest rates,
control of the government deficit and debt and respect of normal fluctuation margins
provided by the exchange-rate mechanism of the European monetary system.
According to MIMIC outcomes, these constraints on policies, together with the
delayed effects of the constitutional revision and reduction in the unemployment
rate (from 7.2% in 1995 to 4.4% in 1999) had a positive consequence for the dynamics
of SE.
Given our empirical results, the policy recommendations to reduce the
Portuguese SE are based on three pillars: (a) To reform the social benefits system,
especially for unemployed people; (b) To improve the efficiency of public sector
together with an increase of economic freedom; (c) To reform tax regulation for the
self-employed.
Devising strategies to target social benefits, especially for the unemployed,
could have advantageous effects in reducing the Portuguense SE. Social welfare
measures should be differentiated according to the dissimilar possibilities of being
involved in an irregular market among sectors, and the different probabilities of
accepting an irregular job depending on personal situations and skills. Given the
aim of SE control, a labour market policy that cuts social contribution rates paid by
employers is more effective than one that gives subsidiary income directly to
unemployed persons.
Estimates show that reductions of the proxy of bureaucracy decrease the size
of SE. Unfortunately, the difficulty in obtaining reliable data on variables such as
economic freedom, regulation burden, and corruption weaken the policy
implications of this result. Anyway, by admitting government employment in the
labour force as a proxy of this type of variables, the estimated positive correlation
supports measures to increase the efficiency of bureaucracy together with actions
to reduce corruption. In general terms, the overburden of regulation is worse, the
more competitive the market economy. A good organization of bureaucratic
machinery is one of the most pressing issues with increasing international JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 270
competition and the enlargement of the European Union. Finally, increasing
efficiency of tax auditing jointly with tax system simplification can improve the
citizens’ attitude toward the State and tax morality.
Regarding reform of tax regulation for self-employed, Bronchi and Gomes-
Santos (2001, p. 29) state that in 1998, “dependent workers and pensioners, who
account for three-quarters of taxpayers, contributed 90 per cent of personal income
tax revenues. Almost all independent workers (99.6 per cent) were able to keep
simplified accounting books for their transactions and operations and 18 per cent
of the total presented negative returns”.13 These figures reveal a bias in the tax
system that favours activities undertaken by the self-employed. Besides, the
forgone revenue creates a sense of unfairness among taxpayers that may lower the
degree of social acceptance of the tax system and encourage non-compliance. In
agreement with Bronchi and Gomes-Santos (2001), we believe that an effective
improvement for the Portuguese tax system could be to impose separate bank
accounts for individual companies (one for private and one for business purposes),
together with making effective use of the new possibility to access bank information
for tax purposes.
To conclude, there are some open questions as to the reliability of MIMIC
estimates. First, other variables are potentially correlated with SE, such as complexity
of the tax system, tax enforcement and socio-cultural factors, but data availability
dictated some serious limitations. Second, the model does not permit to resolve
the endogeneity issue for this kind of phenomenon: Do high levels of taxation,
unemployment, etc., cause a large SE or vice versa? Third, there is a criticism
related to the “real meaning” of the estimated latent variable being “SE” instead of
another concept. Fourth, several difficulties arise for undertaking a time-series
analysis with the MIMIC model (e.g., tests to exhaustively check property of
residuals, methods to perform co-integration analysis in the context of SEM).
Finally, the MIMIC model can reproduce the dynamics of SE but the exact estimates
used for the benchmarking procedure depend on an exogenous estimate (e.g.,
Portuguese SE/GDP in 1995 is equated to 22.1%). This is out of the researcher’s
control and, as any quantification of SE, it is a rough measure. Although these
13 The situation of VAT collection is very similar. According with Bronchi and Gomes-Santos’
(2001) estimates for the 1998: around 91 per cent of tax revenues were paid by 6.3 per cent of
all taxpayers who submitted periodical tax returns. The large majority of taxable small retailers
(93.7 per cent of the total) declared a turnover below 12,500 euro and paid only 8.8 per cent
of tax. These figures make clear that a great part of self-employers and small activities under-
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problems dramatically reduce the descriptive power of the results, if we consider
the econometric alternatives of measuring SE, then the MIMIC approach could be
considered a helpful methodology in this field for at least for two reasons. From a
methodological viewpoint, it is based on a “structural approach” more appropriate
than others given the nature of the SE. From a normative perspective, in addition
to the estimated SE time series, the MIMIC approach provides supplementary
knowledge to understand the economic phenomenon of “shadow activities”.
Though there is space for discussion about the absolute values of SE, there exists
wider academic consensus about the reliability of the coefficients estimated by the
MIMIC model.
Appendix
A. Identification of MIMIC and fit function with means and intercepts
In the Portuguese analysis, a multiple indicators multiple causes model with means
and intercepts is applied. In general, allowing the means and intercepts to be
nonzero could be considered an advance for applications in this field. As Hayduk
(1987, p. 321) states, with the inclusion of means both the model is consistent with
a wider range of evidence than if mere covariances were used, and the structural
coefficients are better because they must now be consistent with broader empirical
evidence.
The main difference from the standard MIMIC model consists in considering a
diverse covariance matrix (precisely a moment matrix) in the fit function used by a
maximum likelihood estimator to compute estimates. For a fuller treatment of the
subject we refer the reader to Hayduk (1987) where the wider context of Structural
Equation Modelling is considered, including means and intercepts. Below, we limit
our attention to show the differences in (model-implied and data-based) covariance
matrices, when means and intercepts are taken into account.
Analogously to the standard MIMIC approach, the SE (h) is linearly determined,
subject to a disturbance æ, by a set of observable exogenous causes x1, x2, … , xq:
qq x ha g z =+ + å                                                                                               (A1)
The latent variable (h) determines, linearly, subject to disturbances e1, e2, … , ep,
a set of observable endogenous indicators y1, y2, … , yp :
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The structural disturbance z and measurement errors e all display normal
distribution and are mutually independent.14 From equations (A1) and (A2), the
model can be presented for the reduced form as a function of observable variables.
As anticipated, compared to the “standard” MIMIC model without means, the
covariance matrix (model-implied) S is substituted by (model-implied) moment matrix
W. It follows that the discrepancy function (Fmeans) considered in the maximum
likelihood in order to estimate parameters is:15
()
means 1 F ln tr M ln M (p+q+1)
- =W + W- -
where M is the observed moment matrix, p is the number of observed endogenous
indicators (Y), q is the number of observed exogenous causes (X), “1” compensates
for the fact that the (augmented) moment matrix has one more row and column than
the S and S matrices in the standard fit function of SEM.
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the covariance matrices among indicators, causes, and
indicators and causes, while m is the vector of estimated means of indicators (Y)
followed by the means of  estimated causes (X).
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14 The assumption of independence between the structural disturbance æ, and the measurement
errors å is crucial for the reliability of estimates. Unfortunately, the SEM packages do not
perform this kind of test. Hayduk (1987, p.193) explains that it “…is purely a matter of
arbitrary convention” and it is possible to test this assumption using a model re-parameterisation.
An attempt to test the hypothesis of independence between structural and measurement errors
is presented in Dell’Anno (2003).
15  The standard fit function is:  ()
1 Fl n t r S l n ( pq ) S
- =+ S - - + S .
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where z is the vector of the means of observed indicators (Y) followed by the
means of the observed causes (X).
According with model MIMIC 6-1-2, in the matrix S the following vectors are
estimated:
Structural parameters (measurement model):  () l ¢ L=- 2 1,
Structural parameters (structural model):  () gggggg G= 123456 ,,,,,
Intercepts of measurement model:  () dd T= = = 11 2 0.24, y y
Intercept of structural model:  () a A= 1
Means of causes:  () K= 123456 ,,,,, kkkkkk
Measurement errors:  () eee Q= 121 2 ,,
Structural disturbance:  () z Y= 11
Variance and covariances among causes:
() fffffff f f F= 1234562 43 45 6 ,,,,,, , ,
These are the 28 free parameters estimated by the ML estimator in the
Portuguese MIMIC model with six causes and two indicators.
B.  Data sources
In the econometric exercise, half-yearly observations extracted by the OECD
Statistical Compendium database are used. These data come from the Economic
Outlook Statistics and Projections, OECD Standardised National Accounts and
OECD Labour Force Statistics. Variables are expressed as percentage points.
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   (A14) JOURNAL OF APPLIED ECONOMICS 274
Table A1. Data description
Variable Symbol Unit root Transf. Sources Note
Government X1 I(1) D(X1) OECD – Employment,
employment in Statistical government
labour force Compendium  /Total labour force
[1°sem.1965-
2°sem.2004]
Tax burden X2 I(1) D(X2) OECD – (Total direct taxes













Social benefits X4 I(1) D(X4) OECD Social benefits paid






Self-employment X5 I(1) D(X5) OECD Self employed/Total
rate – Statistical labour force
Compendium [1°sem.1965-
2°sem.2004]
Unemployment rate X6 I(1) D(X6) OECD Unemployment rate
– Statistical [1°sem.1965-
Compendium 2°sem.2004]
Real gross domestic Y1 I(1) D(Y1) OECD (Real GDPt)/(Real
product index – Statistical GDP1°sem1995)
Compendium [1°sem.1965-
2°sem.2004]
Labour force Y2 I(1) D(Y2) OECD Labour force,
participation  rate  – Statistical participation ratio
Compendium [1°sem.1965-
2°sem.2004]275  THE SHADOW ECONOMY IN PORTUGAL
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